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Abstract. We consider the following problem. A signature authority issues RSA-
signatures of certain types to an individual, and the individual tries, by using the 
signatures he received, to compute an RSA-signature of a type not issued by the 
authority. Is the individual able to do this? The RSA-signatures are products 
of rational powers of residue classes modulo the composite number N of the 
underlying RSA-system, and the residue classes are chosen at random by the 
signature authority. The rational exponents in the product determine the type of 
the signature. 
We prove that computing an RSA-signature of a particular type, from given 
RSA-signatures of other types, is polynomial time reducible to computing RSA-
roots x"' (mod N) for random x and some positive integer d. This extends results 
of Aki and Taylor [1] and Shamir (11] from one variable to arbitrarily many 
variables. As an application of this, under the assumption that for the individual 
it is infeasible to compute RSA-roots, we give necessary and sufficient conditions 
describing whether it is feasible for that individual to compute RSA-signatures of 
a prescribed type from signatures of other types that he received before from the 
authority. 
Key words. RSA, RSA-scheme, RSA-signature, Cryptographic protocol. 
1. Introduction 
Several more complicated cryptographic protocols use as a building block simple 
signature protocols in which only one party, called the signature authority, can create 
signatures and issues them to the other parties, called the individuals. Such protocols 
are used, for instance, in credential systems (e.g., [3]) and payment systems (e.g., 
[2]), in which a signature represents a credential or money. In fact, in such credential 
1 Date received: September S, 1990. Date revised: April 20, 1991. A preliminary version of this paper 
was presented at Eurocrypt '90, May 21-24, Arhus, Denmark, and has appeared in the proceedings, 
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Signature authority :!t Individual .9£ 
chooses x (mod N) randomly, x,S verifies that 
-----
computes S = xe,Je, (mod N) se2 = Xe' (mod N) 
Fig. 1. A signature issuing protocol in which the signature authority !r issues a signature to indivi-
dual sl. 
systems or payment systems, the signature authority issues different types of signa-
tures, corresponding to different credentials or different values of money. The 
security of these systems depends on whether an individual (or a group of conspiring 
individuals) is not able to compute a signature of a type not issued by the signature 
authority, by using the signatures which were issued before by the authority. 
In Fig. 1, we give an example of a signature protocol, based on the RSA-system 
[9], in which the signature authority :!t issues a signature to an individual .91. 
Initially, :!t chooses two large primes P, Q and computes their product N. Further, 
:!t chooses two integers et> e2 with e2 coprime to q>(N) = (P - l}(Q - 1). :!t makes 
N, e1 , e2 public, and keeps P and Q secret. 
In general, for every integer b coprime to <p(N), the congruence y0 = x (mod N) 
has a unique solution (mod N) which we denote by x 11" (mod N). If b > 1, we call 
x 11b (mod N) an RSA-root mod N. For a E Z we put xafb = (x11b)a (mod N). :!t can 
easily compute the RSA-root x 1tb (mod N) by computing first an integer b' with 
bb' = 1 (mod cp(N)), and then xb' (mod N). We assume that for individuals it is 
infeasible to compute RSA-roots (mod N). 
We consider a generalization of this protocol: !Z chooses at random several 
residue classes (mod N), computes a number of RSA-signatures which are products 
of rational powers of these residue classes modulo N, and issues these signatures to 
.91, together with the residue classes. The exponents in the product determine the 
type of signature. It will appear to be useful to consider also the variation in which 
:!t sends only the signatures but not the residue classes to d (so that .91 cannot 
verify the signatures) . .91 might also have received the signatures without the residue 
classes by eavesdropping. It is conceivable that an individual learns several RSA-
signatures issued by !Z (by participating in a signature issuing protocol or by 
eavesdropping) and that he uses these to compute useful signatures not issued by :!t. 
We give an example of the kind of problems we are faced with. Suppose that an 
individual d received two randomly chosen residue classes x 1, x2 (mod N) and a 
signature S = xr13 · xi19 (mod N), and that he wants to compute S' = x~19 (mod N). 
d can easily compute xi/3 (mod N), since x}.'3 = x~2S3 (mod N). But then d has 
still to compute some cube RSA-root. From our Theorem 1, stated in Section 
2, it follows that computing xif9 from {x1, x2 , S} is just as difficult as computing 
x113 (mod N) for each residue class x (mod N). So if d cannot compute RSA-roots, 
then he cannot compute xi19 from {x1 , x2 , S}. 
Akl and Taylor [1] and Shamir [11] considered related problems. Shamir showed, 
roughly speaking, that for pairwise coprime integers k1 , .•• , kr computing x 1/k, from 
{x, x 11ki, ... , x 1fk,} is just as difficult as computing u1/k, from u alone, for random u. 
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Akl and Taylor proved, that if k, k1, .•• , k1 are integers with gcd(k1 , .•• , k,)/ 
gcd(k, ki. ... , k,) = r, then computing xk from {xk1, ••• , x"'} (with x unknown) is at 
least as difficult as computing u1'' from u for random u. We generalize these results 
to arbitrarily many variables as in the example above. Our main result is stated 
in Section 2, independently of the context of protocols mentioned above. Let 
S1 = n xj'·i, ... , SS = n xj•·i, S' ;: n xJ1 (mod N), where the X1 are uniformly 
chosen residue classes (mod N) and the ai.i• bi are rational numbers (we are not 
precise here). Then computing S' from S1 , •.• , s. is polynomial time reducible to 
computing a certain RSA·root on random residue classes (mod N) and vice versa. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we state our results and prove 
these in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the consequences of our results for 
protocols as mentioned above; in particular, we consider two payment systems. 
2. Statements of the Theorems 
We first introduce some notation and terminology. 
Sk the set of vectors (a1 , ••• , ak) with a 1, .. ., ak E S, for any set S; we 
use boldface characters to denote vectors. 
a= b (mod m) m-1(b - a) E 71.k; this is defined for a, be Q,., m, k EN. 
71.{ai. ... , as} {D=1 ~1a,le 1 , .•• , '· E Z}: the abelian group generated by a1 , .•. , 
a, E Qk. 
Q{a 1 , •• ., a.} {Li=i ~1a1 1 ~ 1 , •• ., '· e Q}: the vector space generated by ai. ... , 
(a,b) 
N 
Z* N 
a-1 (mod N) 
<p(N) 
ON 
A.(N) 
xlfd 
a, E Qk. 
a1 b1 + · · · + akbk: the scalar product of a = (a1 , ... , ak) and 
b = (b,, ... , hie). 
a composite, odd number; so N = p~' · · · p:• with p1, ••• , p, distinct 
odd primes and k1, ..• , k, e N. 
the set {ala EN, 1 ::s; a ::s; N, gcd(a, N) = 1}. 
the number b E zi with ab := 1 (mod N); for a E zi. 
Euler's Totient function: cp(N) = IZ~I = il~=i p~.-i(P; - 1). 
the ring { a/dla, d E ?l.., d > 0, gcd(d, cp(N)) = 1 }. 
Carmichael'sfunction: A.(N) = lcm(p~ 1 - 1 (p 1 - 1), ... , p~·-1 (p, - 1)). 
the dth RSA-root of x (mod N): the unique solution SE Z~ to 
S4 =: x (mod N) for x E 71.~ and d E '1l.. with gcd(d, <p(N)) = 1. 
the number SE Z~ with S = xf 1 x~2 • • • xf1c (mod N), for x = 
(x1, .. ., xk) E (Z;)k and a = (a1, ... , ak) E (QNf. 
In this paper we use notions like deterministic and probabilistic algorithms which 
can be given a precise mathematical meaning, for instance, using deterministic 
and probabilistic Turing machines, see [ 4]. The only nondeterministic operations 
allowed in a probabilistic algorithm are unbiased coin tosses. In the algorithms we 
consider, the inputs are tuples of integers and rationals, and the length of such an 
input is the sum of the lengths of the binary representations of the integers and the 
numerators and denominators of the rational numbers in the input. In general, both 
the output and the running time of a probabilistic algorithm are stochastic variables 
depending on the input and the random coin tosses. However, in this paper 
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we consider only probabilistic algorithms whose running time is determined by only 
the input. Thus, if a probabilistic algorithm is used to solve a particular problem, 
then it may output a solution not with certainty but only with some probability of 
success. Generally, the underlying probability space consists of the strings of bits, 
chosen during the execution of the algorithm, with uniform distribution, and a set 
J of possible inputs, from which input I is chosen with probability p1 • Thus, if some 
algorithm solves a problem with conditional probability of success s1 given input 
I, then its unconditional probability of success is "f.1 eJ p1s1• By a polynomial time 
algorithm we mean a deterministic algorithm whose running time depends polyno-
mially on the length of the input. 
Let a 1 , .. ., &8 , be (ON)1· We consider the problem of computing x 11 for random 
x e (Z~f, if {x•1, ••• , x•·} (but not necessarily x) are given as inputs. We distinguish 
two cases, to each of which a theorem is devoted. 
In Theorem 1 below, a1, ••. , a., bare vectors in (ONf, satisfying 
be Q{a1, ... , a,}; length(N, a 1 , ... , a,, b) = L; } (l) 
gcd(d, rp(N)) = 1, where d = min{x EN lxb e l{a1 , •. ., a.}}. 
Theorem 1. Let a 1, ••• , a., b satisfy (1). 
(i) For every probabilistic algorithm AL that with input { N, al> .. ., a., b, x•1, ... , 
x •·} computes x b in time ;::;; TAL with probability of success ~&AL for random 
x e (l~)1, there exists a probabilistic algorithm AL that for arbitrary u e lfe 
computes u11d in time ;::;;TAL + L 0 <1) with probability of success ~!eAL· 
(ii) For every probabilistic algorithm AL that with input {N, u} computes u1' 11 in 
time ~ TAL with probability of success ~eAL for random u e z~. there exists 
a probabilistic algorithm AL that for arbitrary x e (lfe)" computes x • from 
{N b •1 • } • t' ./ T. + L 0<1> 'th b b"l't if ,a1 , •.. ,a,, ,x , ... ,x • zn zme.:::. AL wz pro a ii yo success 
~!&AL· 
Remark 1. Theorem 1 can be generalized to the case that gcd(d, <p(N)) > 1. Let 
Gd be the largest subgroup of Z~ whose order is coprime to d. Then for every u e Gd, 
there is a unique x e G11 with xd = u (mod N) and we denote this x by u11". We can 
prove that for every probabilistic algorithm AL as in Theorem 1 there is a prob-
abilistic algorithm AL that for arbitrary u e G, computes u•fd in time s; TAL + L 0 <1> 
with probability of success ~ !eAL. As the proof of this generalization is precisely 
the same as that of Theorem 1, we do not work it out. 
Remark 2. Theorem 1 deals with the situation that x• has to be computed from 
x•1, ••• , x•• while x itself is not known. We can treat the case that x11 has to 
be computed from x•1, ... , x•· and x, by applying Theorem 1 with at> ... , a,, 
e1 = (1, 0, ... , 0), e2 = (0, 1, ... , 0), ... , e1c = (0, .. ., 0, 1), instead of a 1, ••• , a,. Note 
that be Q{a1 , .. ., a,, et> ... , e1c} for all a 1 , .• ., a., be (ONf· Further, if dis the 
smallest positive integer x with xb e '11. { a 1 , ••• , a,, e 1 , ••• , e1J, then dis the gcd of all 
these integers x. Hence if be (ON)\ then gcd(d, <p(N)) = 1. 
We can also treat the case in which x~' · .. x~· has to be computed from xT', ... , 
x;• for certain b1 , •• ., b, e (QN)1c, where x1 , ... , x. are distinct vectors from (lfe)t: 
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namely, put x' := (x 1, •.. , x,.), a~ := (a1 , 0, ... , 0), a2 := (0, a2 , 0, ... , 0), ... , a~:= 
(0, ... , 0, a .. ), b' := (b1 , ... , b.), and apply Theorem 1 with x', a'1 , •.• , a~, b'. 
In Theorem 2 below, a1, ..• , a., b are vectors in (ON )k, satisfying 
b ~ Q{a1 , ..• , a,}; length(N, at> ... , a., b) = L; } (2) 
d = min{x E NJ3~1> ... , ~. G Z: xb == L~=l eiai (mod A.(N))}. 
Note that dis the gcd of all the integers x as in (2). Hence d divides A.(N). We 
have: 
Theorem 2. Let a 1 , ••• , a., b satisfy (2). 
(i) There exists a po/ ynomial (in L) time algorithm that computes a nonzero multiple 
of A.(N)/d from 8 1, •.. , a., b. 
(ii) For every x E (1'.fe)\ the cardinality of the set {z E Z~J3y E (Z,V: y" = z 
(mod N), y•' = x•' (mod N) for i = 1, ... , s} is equal to the number of solutions 
z E Z~ of z4 =:: 1 (mod N). 
For instance, if d = l then from 8 1 , •.. , a,, b we can compute in polynomial (in 
L) time a multiple of A.(N)and from that we can compute in probabilistic polynomial 
(in length (N)) time the factorization of N [1]. In the other extreme situation that 
d = ).(N), if x•1, ••• , x•· are given but x is unknown, then every number in zi is 
possible for x•. 
3. Proofs 
We need some lemmas to prove Theorems 1and2. 
Lemma 1. There is a polynomial time algorithm that computes for every a 1 , ••. , 
a, E Qk a basis {e1 , ... , et} of :71..k and dl> ... , d, E O>o such that {d1e1, •. ., d,e,} 
is a basis of "1L { a1 , ••• , a.}. 
Proof. For 8 1, ..• , a, E zk this follows from the result of Kannan and Bachem [6] 
that we can compute in polynomial time the Smith normal form of an integral 
matrix. For a 1, ... , a, e Qk, one may first computed E N such that da 1, ... , da, E :71..k 
and then apply the result of Kannan and Bachem. O 
Lemma 2. For a, b E Z, a, b-:/: 0, let (a\b) denote the largest positive divisor of a 
which is not divisible by any prime number dividing b. There is a polynomial time 
algorithm that computes (a\b) from a, be Z, a, b # 0. 
Proof. Consider the sequence of integers c0 =!al, c1 = c0 /gcd(c0 , b), c2 = cif 
gcd(ci. b), .... There is an i such that gcd(c1, b) = I; let i0 be the smallest such i. 
Since c 1 :;; c0 /2, c2 s cif2, ... , C;0 s c10_if2, c10+1 = c10 , we have i0 S log!aJjJog 2. 
Hence it takes polynomial time to compute c;0 • For each prime number p and each 
a e :71.., a # 0, let ordp(a) be the integer such that a· p-ord,,t•l is an integer not divisible 
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by p. Obviously, ordp(ci0 ) = 0 for each prime p dividing b. Further, if p is a prime 
dividing a but not b, then ordP(a} = ordp(c0 ) = ordp(c1) = · · · == ordp(c1G). It follows 
that ci0 = (a\b). O 
Lemma 3. Let a 1, •.. , as e Ok, be l!l{al> ... , a.}, and let d be the smallest positive 
integer such that db E Z { a1 , ... , a,}. Then there is a vector re Qt such that the 
denominators of the coordinates of r are composed of prime numbers dividing d and 
such that 
(a1, r) E Z for i = 1, ... , t, 1 (b, r) - d E Z. (3) 
Further, there is a polynomial time algorithm that computes d and such a vector r from 
a 1, ... , a,, b. 
Proof. Compute a basis {e1, ... , ek} ofZk andd1, ... ,d1 E O>o as in Lemma 1 from 
81, ... ' a •. Further, compute e 1 • ... , ~I E Q with b = L'i=l e1d1e;, e.g., by Gauss 
elimination. Then d is the smallest positive integer such that d~ 1, ... , de1 E "11.. and 
so it can be computed in polynomial time. Let u1 , ••• , u, be the numerators of d1, 
... , d1, respectively. Compute (u1 \d), .. ., (u1\d). Note that gcd{d, e1d(u1 \d}, ... , 
~1d(Ui \d)) = 1. Now compute s1 , ••• , s1 E 7l.. satisfying 
t L ~;d(u,\d)s, = 1 (mod d), (4) 
i~l 
with Euclid's algorithm. Finally, computer E Qk, e.g., by Gauss elimination, with 
{
s,(ui\d) . d-- fori=l, ... ,t. (e;, r) = i 
0 fori=t+l, ... ,k. 
(5) 
Note that the denominators of s;(u1\d)/d1 are composed of primes dividing d for 
i = 1, ... , t. Since { e1, ... , ek} is a basis of Z."', this implies that the denominators of 
the coordinates of r are also composed of primes dividing d. Further, from (5) and 
a; E .l{ d1 e 1, ••• , d1et} it follows that (a1, r) E 7l.. for i = l, ... , t. Finally, from (4), (5), 
and b = L~=t ~1d1 e;, it follows that <b. r) - 1/d E 7!... It is easy to verify that all the 
computations mentioned above cost polynomial time. This proves Lemma 3. O 
Proof of Theorem 2. We assume that a 1, •.. , a., b E zk which is no restriction. 
Indeed, ifa1, ••. ,a,,b E (ONl• then we can compute in polynomial (in L)time me N 
with gcd(m, A.(N)) = 1 such that a!:= mai (i = 1, ... , s), b' := mb E 7!..11., and we can 
proceed further with a'1 , ... , a~, b'. The integer d is also the smallest positive integer 
X for which xb' =: L},,1 e;a~ (mod A(N)) is solvable in ~1• .•. , ~t E Zand Xf-+X"' is 1-1 
on Z~. Hence {z E Z~l3y E (Z~)k: yb' = z, y•i = x•i (mod N) for i = 1, ... , s} has the 
same cardinality as {z E l;13y e (.Z~)": y"' = z, y•' == x•1 (mod N) for i = l, ... , s}. 
(i) Compute a basis { e 1 , •.• , e"} of Z" and d1 , ••• , d1 (which are now positive 
integers) such that {d1 e1 , .•• , d1e1} is a basis of Z{a1 , ••• , •s}. Further, compute 
integers {31 , ... , f31c such that b = L~=i {31e1• Since b 1$ Ill { a 1 , ••• , a,}, at least one of 
the integers /31+1 •••• , P1c. /11+1 say, is nonzero. There are integers 17 1 , .•• , 171 such that 
Which New RSA-Signatures Can Be Computed from Certain Given RSA-Signatures? 47 
db = :D .. 1 111d1ei (mod l(N)). This implies that d/3r.;.i = 0 (mod l(N)). Hence f3t+1 is 
a nonzero multiple of J.(N)/d. All operations mentioned above can be done in 
polynomial (in L) time and so /Jr+i can be computed in polynomial (in L) time. This 
proves (i). 
(ii) Let S1 = { z e Z;l 3y e (Z:)1i:: y• = z, y•• = 1 (mod N) for i = l, ... , s }. Then 
{z E z:13y E CZ.1;Y': y• = z, y•1 = x•1 (mod N) for i = 1, ... , s} = {z·x•1z E Si}. Hence 
it suffices to show, that S1 is equal to S2 := {z E z;1z" == 1 (mod N)}. 
First take z E S1. There are e l • ... ' e, E z such that db = L~=l e,a, (mod l(N)). 
Together with the fact that a1<N> = 1 (mod N) for every a e z:, this implies that for 
some ye (Z~)1c: z" = y"" = CTf.1 (y•1).e' = 1 (mod N). Hence z e S2 • It follows that 
S1 s; S2. 
Now takez e S2 . We can factor N asN = p~' ·· · p:•wherep1, ••• ,p,areoddprimes 
and ki. ... , k, e N. Put o1 = gcd(d, <p(pf')) for i = 1, ... , t. Then O; is the smallest 
positive integer x such that xb = L:~z1 e1•1 <mod <Pi> has a solution in e 1 • .... 
e. E Z, where <p1 = p71- 1(p1 - 1), i.e., the smallest positive integer x for which 
xb e .Z{a1, •• ., a., r.p1e1 , •• ., q>1e11J, where {e1 , •• ., e11J is any basis of Z1• By Lemma 
3, there is a vector r, with 
(ai,r)e.Z for j=l, ... ,s, 
(<p1e1, r) e Z for j = 1, ... , k, 
l (b, r) - ""i. E Z. 
I 
Put v := <f'if. Then v = (v1, .. ., v,.) E zt and 
(ai, v) = 0 (mod <f'i) 
<P· (b, v) = i (mod <P;). 
I 
for 
(6) 
Sincez e S2, wehavez 61 = 1 (mod pf'). Further, the group of residue classes mod pf' 
coprime to Pi is cyclic of order 'Pi· Hence there is a residue class wi (mod pt•) with 
wt"6' = z (mod pf•). Put Yi= (w/'', ... , w;"k), Then (6) implies that yrJ = w/-J·» = 1 
(mod pf•) for j = 1, ... , s and y~ = w?·•> = wtp•111 = z (mod pt•). By the Chinese 
remainder theorem, there is a y e (Z~f with y = y1 (mod pt') for i = 1, ... , t. This 
y satisfies y•J = 1 (mod N) for j = 1, ... , s, and y11 = z (mod N). Hence z e S1• We 
conclude that also S2 s; S1• Therefore S2 = S1 and part (ii) of Theorem 2 has been 
~~ 0 
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume we are given N and a1, ..• , a,, b E (QN f satisfying (1). 
(i) Assume there is a probabilistic algorithm AL which from x•1, ••• , x•· computes 
x• in time ~ TAL(L) with probability of success ;;:::eAL(L) for randomly chosen 
x e (Z~)". Fix u e Zl We describe a probabilistic algorithm AL to compute u1'"· 
The idea is to apply AL to the vector u = (u\ .... u'") for an appropriate vector 
t e QN. However, this u is not a random vector in (Z~Y'. all its coordinates being a 
power of the same residue class, and so we do not know anything about the 
probability of success when AL is applied to u. We use the well-known trick 
of applying AL instead to a vector of the fonn x = (u 11r;,", ... , u'"'r:'), where 
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r = (r1 , ••• , rk) is randomly chosen from (Z~)" and m is such that ma1 , .•. ,ma,, 
mb e (Z~l. Since Zfe is a multiplicative group and the mapping x-+ x"' on Z~ is 1-1 
in view of gcd(m, <P(N)) = 1, this vector x is uniformly distributed on (Zfet 
Below we describe the algorithm AL (all congruences are mod N): 
Step 1. Compute t = (t 1, ••• , t,.) e Qk and ix1 , ••• , ixk> f3 E l such that (a1, t) = ix1 for 
i = 1, ... , s, (b, t) + f3 ::: 1/d and the denominators of ti. ... , tt are com-
posed of primes dividing d. Since gcd(d, <p(N)) = 1, we have t E (ONt Com-
pute m such that ma1 (i = 1, ... , s), mb e lk. 
Step 2. Choose r = (r 1 , .• ., rk) from (Zfef. 
Step 3. Compute u";rma, = u <•;.t> · r"'•1 = x•1 for i = 1, ... , s, where x = (u 1•rr, ... , 
u1kr;:'). This computation is easy since ix1 E '71., ma1 e zk for i = 1, ... , s. We 
remark that it need not be feasible to compute x. 
Step 4. Apply AL to x•1, ••• , x•·. 
Step 5. If AL outputs xb, then compute x•r-"'•u.B = u<•.t>+P = u1111• This is possible 
since f3 E "lL. and mb e "ll.k. 
We did not yet specify the way r is chosen from {"ll..N)k in Step 2. There is no known 
polynomial time method to simulate a perfect uniform choice from lfe with a 
probabilistic algorithm whose only possible nondeterministic operations are coin 
tosses. But we can proceed as follows. Compute the integer K with N ~ 2K < 2N. 
Chooseratrandomfrom { 1, .. ., 2K} by doing K coin tosses.Check if r E {1, ... , N - 1} 
and gcd(r, N) = 1. If so, take the residue class r (mod N). Thus, we get an element 
of Z~ with probability of success <p(N)/2K;;::: 1/(12 log log N), in view of the 
inequality <P(N);;::: N/(6 log log N) for N > 3 [10]. There is a constant c > 0 
with 1 - (1 - 1/(12 log log N))c1oak·toglogN ~ {t)11k. Hence, after at most ck log k · 
K log log N coin tosses we find a vector r E ("ll..~)k with probability of success ~+ 
Moreover, the conditional probability distribution ofr given success is uniform on 
(Zfet-
Steps 1, 2, 3, and 5 of algorithm AL described above have running time L 0 <0 . 
Further, Step 4 has running time TAv Hence the running time of AL is 
s TAL + L 0 <1>. Step 2 has probability of success ;?j. Given success in Step 2, the 
conditional probability distribution of x is uniform on ("ll.N)1 and hence the 
conditional probability of success in Step 4 is ;;:::eAL· Therefore, the uncon-
ditional probability of success of AL is 2 teAL· This proves (i). 
(ii) Assume we are given a probabilistic algorithm AL which from randomly 
chosen u E "ll..N computes u11d in time ~ TAL and probability of success ~eAL(L). We 
construct the following algorithm AL (the congruences are mod N): 
Step 1. Compute ~ 1, ... , ~. e l. such that db = I ~;ai. 
Step 2. Choose r E Zfe. 
Step 3. Compute u =: rd· Il;(x•')~'. 
Step 4. Apply AL to u. 
Step 5. If AL outputs u 114, then compute r-1u114 = TI1(x8'){,/d = (x41')1'" = x~. 
If we choose r in Step 2 as described above, then with essentially the same argument 
as above, it follows that AL has running time :::;; TAL + L 0 <1> and probability of 
success 2!eAL for arbitrary :x e (Z~)k. This proves (ii). D 
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4. Some Practical Applicstions 
We go back to the protocols of Section 1. Let N be a composite modulus and let 
a 1 , ••• , a,, be (ON )1r.. Signature authority fir chooses at random x e (Z~)1r. and issues 
the signatures x•1, ••• , xa. to the individual d. .!ii wants to compute x•. Is he able 
to do this? Of course, we assume that for .!ii it is infeasible to compute RSA-roots 
modulo N, since otherwise he could forge all signatures. Theorem 1 implies the 
following. 
Corollary. Assume there is an integer d with (d, cp(N)) = 1 and db e l{a1 , ••• , a8 }. 
Then it is feasible for .!ii to compute x" from {N, a1, ..• , a., b, x••, ... , x••} for 
uniformly chosen x e (.l~)1r. if and only if be .Z {a1 , ••• , a,}. 
(We do not want to make precise the notion of "computational infeasibility.") If 
be Z{a 1 , .•• , a.}, then x• can be computed from x•1, ••• , x•· simply by multiplying 
and dividing (mod N): if < 1 , ... , <. e .l are such that b = < 1 a 1 + · · · + e,a., then 
x" := n:=i (x••)~• (mod N). Hence the corollary means that .!ii cannot compute 
RSA-signatures from other ones, unless he is able to do this using only the obvious 
operations on RSA-signatures: multiplying and dividing (mod N). This corollary 
can also be used in situations where !tissues also x or in which .!ii receives signatures 
x~· •... , x:· on distinct vectors x 1 , ..• , x, (see Remark 2 of Section 2). 
We now give two examples related to coin systems to illustrate the corollary. 
Example 1. In (2], a user-anonymous off-line check system is introduced. Here 
we discuss a special attack by the user on this system. We consid~r only a simplified 
version of the check system (not providing user anonymity) which, however, makes 
no difference for the attack we discuss. 
The bank chooses a composite modulus N and two one-way functions f, g and 
makesN,f,gpublic.Assumetheuserwantsacheckof$1023 == $(2° + 21 + ... + 29 ) 
from the bank. To this end, he chooses numbers b;, r;, s; and computes M1 = 
f(g(b;, r;)), m; = f(g(b;, s;)), a1 = Mt'0 ·ml 7 (i = 0, ... , 9) (all congruences are 
mod N), and sends a 1 , ... , cx 10 to the bank. (In the original user-anonymous 
protocol, the user includes so-called blinding factors in the cx1's to hide the M/s and 
m;'s from the bank (see also (3]) and uses a cut-and-choose protocol to convince 
the bank that he formed the a./s as described in the protocol). The bank withdraws 
$1023 from the user's account and sends back the signature D = CTf=oaf1Cl 7•3•0 - 1i. 
Then the user can compute (note that 6947 · 17-2 · 310 = 1) 
( 9 )6947 ( 9 )2 9 c = D-2 · 310 • n Mt . TI mt = n Mt117, 
i=O i=O i=O 
( 9 )-6947 ( 9 )-l 9 C' = D6947·3'o. fl M/' . fl mt = fl mr-10. 
i=O 1=0 a=O 
Assume that the user wants to pay $a = $(Li=o a1210- 1) at the shop with this check, 
where aj e {O, 1} for i = 0, ... , 9. To this end, the user gives the number C to the 
shop, as well as the numbers u; := g(b;, r;) for those i with a; == 0, and b" r1 for those 
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· · h 1 Th h h k h c . . c n 3'/1, n < 31/17 i wit a; = . e s op c ec s t at is correct, i.e., = a.=o u1 a,=1 g b,, r,) . 
After some time, the shop sends C and the revealed Ui. bi, r1 to the bank (since the 
system is off-line, the shop does not send the numbers he received from a user at 
once, but first collects the numbers from several users). The bank checks that C is 
correct and that he did not receive the b;'s before, and stores the b/s. 
The user gets back from the bank the amount from this check which he did not 
spend (i.e., $(Lr=o (1 - a,)210- 1)) as follows: he gives C' to the bank together with 
the numbers g(bi. r;) for those i with a; = 1, and b;, r; for those i with a, = 0. The 
bank checks that C' is correct, checks that he did not receive the revealed b/s before 
and if so, refunds the user the money. 
Assume that the user tries to cheat, i.e., tries to spend $a at the shop and to get 
back from the bank $b, where a + b > 1023. Note that the user cannot show the 
same b, to both the shop (when buying) and the bank (when asking for refund), 
otherwise he is caught cheating. The user could try to make a new signature 
C n9 M3«1J111 C' n9 11-3-<Q-•o h · ·d · 1 · a = 1• 0 ; or " = i=o m, , w ere u is a nom ent1ca permutation 
of (0, ... , 9). Then the user could cheat as follows: he looks for i 1 such that 
u(i1 ) = i2 > i 1 ; he spends $(L1,.,, 2') at the shop by using C (as explained above); 
and when asking for refund, be shows C~ and b,,, r1, to the bank, in order to get 
$(212 ) as refund in stead of $(211 ). The user could cheat with signature Ca as follows: 
he looks for j 1 such that u(ji) = j 2 < j 1 ; he shows C,, to the shop and spends 
$(Li,.h 21) using only $(Lt,.;. 21) from his check; and gets back from the bank $(2i•) 
by showing it C'. 
Note that in order to compute C" or C~, the user may use M0 , ••• , Mg 
mo, ... , mg, D. Put e1 = (1, 0, ... , Oh ... , e2o = (0, ... , 0, 1), Ca = L}21 (3a(i-l)/17)e1, 
' _ 1"10 3aCl)-lO d _ 1"10 (17. 311-i)-1(310 + 17 ) _ (M M 
c., - L,.i=l ei+lO• - L..•=1 e; e1+10 , m - o•. • ·, 9, 
m0 , ••• ,m9 ). Thus, M1 =me;+i (i=0, ... ,9), m;=me1+ 11 (i=0, ... ,9h D=m•, 
Ca = m'"', C~ = me:. Assume that the user cannot compute RSA-roots (mod N) of 
random numbers, and that f, g are good pseudo-random functions, so that we may 
consider mas a randomly chosen vector. Then the corollary implies that the user can 
compute C,, or C~ from M0 , ••• , Mg, m0 , ••. , mg, D if and only if c,, or c~ belongs to 
A= Z{eu ... , e20, d}. But it is easy to show, using that 3 is a primitive root 
(mod 17), that none of the vectors c,,, c~ belongs to A unless q is the identity. Hence 
the kind of attack described above fails at this check-system. 
Example 2. Consider the user-anonymous off-line coin system of [8]. In this 
system, the bank uses a signature scheme which we do not specify here. The user 
makes RSA-signatures using his own modulus N whose factorization he keeps 
secret; so here the user plays the role of a signature authority. Let L be a fixed 
integer, and define I = (IDuserllR)L mod N, where R is a number chosen at random 
by the user. In Fig. 2 the basic idea of the withdrawal (in which the user is able 
to blind and the bank to sign messages, see [8]) and spending protocol of a coin is 
given. Later on, the shop sends the numbers that it received to the bank and the 
bank verifies that these numbers have not been used before. 
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User 
X:random 
Withdrawal of a coin 
Bank 
blindcd(N,I,X) 
siga(blindcd(N, l, X)) 
User 
Spending of a coin 
N,I,X,sip(N,l,X) 
E: random,(E,L)=l 
Fig. 2. The (simplified) off-line coin system of [8). 
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From the corollary it follows that it is not feasible for the shop/bank to e<.'mpute 
the identity of the user (i.e., J1IL mod N) from N, I, X, E, L and C = x11L • fEIL_ But 
if the user spends the same coin at two shops, then the bank receives N, I, X, L, 
sign(N, J, X), two integers £ 1 , E2 that are coprime with L, and the signatures 
(X · / 81 ) 11L (mod N) and (X · JE2 ) 1tL (mod N). From the corollary it follows that the 
bank can compute I 11L mod N from this (and hence the user's identity) if and only 
if gcd(E 1 - E2 , L) = 1. Hence the probability that a double spender is caught by 
the bank is approximately cp(L)/L (because E 1, E2 are randomly chosen). This 
probability is close to 1 if L is a large prime, and close to 0 if L is the product of 
many small primes. Therefore, it is not wise to let the user choose L freely himself 
(which was the original suggestion), but better to fix L as a large prime. 
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